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Légal Régulation of Collective Bargaining 
in the Ontario Public Sector 
Donald D. Carter 
In this paper, the author describes the major features of 
the légal structure for collective bargaining in the Ontario 
public sector. The emphasis is mostly placed upon the Crown 
Employées Collective Bargaining Act which applies to a sub-
stantial portion of the Ontario public sector labor force. The 
basic issues dealt with include : disputes seulement, scope 
of bargaining, détermination of bargaining units, représenta-
tion élections and political activities. 
My starting point is the observation that the rôle that the govern-
ment plays as employer is at times bound to conflict with its rôle as go-
vernor. As employer, the government is a party to the setting of terms 
and conditions of employment for its employées while, as governor, it 
has ultimate responsibility for, and suprême authority over, the ordering 
of affairs within its jurisdiction. It would be préférable if thèse rôles were 
played on completely separate stages, but I seriously doubt whether this 
idéal can ever be attained. To give an example, government, as governor, 
often does establish legitimate public policy that will affect the terms 
and conditions of employment of its employées, such as when a décision 
is made to dévote less public money to a particular government function. 
In this situation, the employées engaged to perform those services may 
find that the lower value placed upon thèse services affects their levels 
of rémunération. Another example of this conflict could occur where a 
government determined to curb in-
flation institutes a policy of wage 
restraint in bargaining with its em-
ployées. Conversely, the determined 
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wage demands of government employées may blunt any public policy 
to eut government spending, either in a particular area, or in gênerai. 
The émergence of collective bargaining in the public sector has 
accentuated this conflict. Public employées, through collective negotiation, 
hâve obtained the means by which they can vigorously pursue legitimate 
employée goals, which may at times conflict with public goals. Govern-
ment, as a party to a collective bargaining relationship, finds that the 
wide managerial powers that it formerly enjoyed hâve been narrowed. 
The réduction of managerial power means that, even though government 
is still suprême as governor, it no longer enjoy the same supremacy as 
employer. The concern, of course, is that collective bargaining by re-
stricting the government's rôle as employer will spill over and affect the 
gênerai power of government. Put another way, can the government be 
a fair and responsive employer and still carry out its primary function 
of governance ? 
Légal structures established to regulate public sector collective bar-
gaining reflect the fondamental tension caused by the conflict of thèse 
two rôles of government. Ideally, the législation should attempt to isolate 
the two rôles in order to reduce confusion. The law should make it clear 
to governments that collective bargaining will impose new responsibilities 
upon the government as employer, while, on the other hand, the law 
should make it clear to employées that collective bargaining is not a weapon 
to be used to achieve political ends. The problem, of course, is that this 
states the problem too simply. The considérable overlap between the 
two rôles makes it impossible for legislators to completely isolate the 
two rôles. As a resuit, any légal framework provided for public sector 
collective bargaining is not likely to provide easy answers to this funda-
mental problem, and the Ontario législation is no exception. 
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Employées in the Ontario public sector do not fall under a single 
légal régime for collective bargaining. It should be added that I use the 
term « public sector » in its broad sensé to cover those employées whose 
rémunération, either directly or indirectly, is substantially derived from 
the public funds of the province. Included in this term would be not only 
provincial public servants, and employées of most Crown agencies, but 
also employées of public institutions financed by the province, such as 
hospitals, schools, and universities. Excluded from this définition would 
be municipal employées whose rémunération is primarily derived from 
local taxation. 
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The most extensive légal régime in the Ontario public sector is the 
Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act1, covering public servants, 
employées of the Liquor Control Board, the Liquor Licence Board, the 
Ontario Housing Corporation, the Niagara Parks Commission, the Work-
men's Compensation Board, and employées of the collèges of applied arts 
and technology. Although this latter group is expressly excluded by the 
Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act2, they are brought back 
into the fold by the Ministry of Collèges and Universities Amendment 
Act, 1972 3. Members of the Ontario Provincial Police Force are also 
expressly excluded from the Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act, 
and they fall under a spécial légal structure for collective bargaining, esta-
blished by the Police Amendment Act, 1972. 4 Employées of Ontario 
Hydro and the Ontario Northland Transportation Commission are, by 
virtue of the Public Service Act5, not considered as Crown employées, 
and fall under the private sector légal régime provided by the Labour Re-
lations Act6. Employées of the province's hospitals, schools and univer-
sities also fall under the Labour Relations Act,7 with the exception of 
elementary and secondary school teachers. As is well known, the Ontario 
government is now in the process of establishing a spécial légal régime 
to regulate collective bargaining by elementary and secondary school 
teachers. The total picture is one of a patch-work quilt of légal structures 
covering employées in the Ontario public sector, raising the question of 
whether such a multiplicity of structures is necessary. Any rational justi-
fication, of course, would hâve to be based on the différent work situations 
of thèse groups of public employées. 
THE CROWN EMPLOYEES COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT 
The most sophisticated législative attempt to deal with the problems 
of public sector collective bargaining in Ontario is the Crown Employées 
Collective Bargaining Act. This statute, covering the largest group of 
public employées in Ontario, establishes a régime for collective bargaining 
i S.O. 1972, c. 67. 
2 S. 1 (1) (g) (ii). 
3 S.O. 1972, c. 114, s. 2. 
4 S.O. 1972, c. 103. 
5 R.S.O. 1970, c. 386. Employées of the Workmen's Compensation Board until 
recently were also excluded by this Act from the Crown employée category. This 
situation was altered by S.O. 1972, c. 96, s. 1. 
6 R.S.O. 1970, c. 232. 
7 S. 2 (f) excludes teachers as defined in The Teaching Profession Act, R.S.O. 
1970, c. 456. 
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quite différent from the régime for the private sector, and from public 
sector régimes in other jurisdictions. The distinctive approaches contained 
in the Act appear to be designed to ensure that the function of governance 
is not impaired by participation of government in the collective bargain-
ing process. 
DISPUTE SEULEMENT MECHANISM AND SCOPE OF BARGAINING 
The most outstanding feature of the Act, and probably the most 
controversial, is the complète prohibition against any forai of strike ac-
tion 8. The justification for this prohibition is that the withdrawal of the 
services of public employées would disrupt the function of governance. 
But, the removal of the right to strike, raises the vexing question of 
whether collective bargaining can exist in the absence of the économie 
sanction of the strike. The answer to this question and the justification 
for prohibiting strikes are bound together. If one accepts the premise that 
collective bargaining is more than an exercise of économie power but 
is also an exercise involving appeals to public opinion, then the strike 
weapon may not be essential. This is especially true in the public sector 
where the employer is likely to be much more sensitive to the attitudes 
of the public. Putting the emphasis on public appeals, however, means 
that bargaining agents must hâve sufficient resources to finance the so-
phisticated advocacy required for this exercise. The need for financially 
viable bargaining agents dictâtes that the bargaining agents hâve a wide 
constituency from which to draw their financial support. At the same 
time, the large bargaining units required for this type of collective bar-
gaining justify the prohibitions of strike activity, since the withdrawal 
of services by so large a number of employées at one time would hâve 
a substantial impact on the government's rôle as governor. Thus, the 
type of collective bargaining established under the Act, with its emphasis 
on public advocacy, provides the justification for the removal of the right 
to strike. 
In place of strike action, the Act provides for interest dispute arbi-
tration as the method of resolving bargaining impasses9. This arbitral 
structure is given some permanence, since the Act provides for the ap-
pointaient, for a term of two years, of a permanent chairman to préside 
over ail boards constituted under the Act. The nominees of the employer 
and the employée organization, however, are appointed on an ad hoc 
8 S. 25. 
9 S. 9. 
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basis. Perhaps the most difficult task facing arbitration boards is to define 
the scope of collective bargaining under the Act. Section 17, designed 
to protect the management power of government, sets out a number of 
matters that may not be the subject of collective bargaining and arbitration. 
Those matters expressly mentioned are « the right to détermine employ-
ment, appointment, complément, organization, work methods and pro-
cédures, kinds and location of equipment, discipline and termination of 
employment, assignment, classification, job évaluation, merit System, 
training and development appraisal, superannuation, and the principles 
and standards governing promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off and reap-
pointment. » The difficulty is that there appears to be some overlap be-
tween section 17 and section 6, which expressly sets out the matters that 
are bargainable. The most obvious overlap is between the bargainable 
matter of « methods of effecting promotions, demotions, transfers, lay-
off s or reappointments », and the non-bargainable matter of « the prin-
ciples and standards governing promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off 
and reappointment ». Hère is a clear example of the tension inhérent in 
a public sector collective bargaining statute. The statute, in attempting 
to both protect the function of governance and to provide for meaningful 
collective bargaining appears contradictory. 
Who should be the Solomon to résolve such apparent contradictions 
— the arbitration board with jurisdiction to résolve bargaining impasses, 
or the Public Service Labour Relations Tribunal with overall authority 
to administer the statute ? This issue was recently argued before the tri-
bunal by the Civil Service Association of Ontario, representing the com-
munity collège teachers, and by the Ontario Council of Régents, the 
employer. The tribunal concluded that the wording of the Act, although 
not expressly dealing with the problem, indicated that the board and not 
the tribunal, had primary jurisdiction to détermine questions of arbitra-
bility. The tribunal took the approach that, although it was its rôle to 
administer the structure for collective bargaining, this rôle did not extend 
to adjudicating upon the merits of individual disputes. It was the view of 
the tribunal that this interprétation of the Act made good collective bar-
gaining sensé, since it was désirable that initial bargaining be conducted 
without the intervention of an adjudicative body. 
The impact of this décision is that it allows greater flexibility in 
initial bargaining. Employée demands may be placed on the bargaining 
table for discussion without an immédiate challenge of their legitimacy 
under the Act. This approach also avoids the possibility of duplicating 
the arbitration exercise. It seems likely that the tribunal, in order to de-
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termine the legitimacy of employée demands, would hâve to become 
substantially involved in the merits of the dispute, since many questions 
of arbitrability cannot be decided in isolation from the context of bargain-
ing. But, once the legitimacy of employée demands had been determined 
by the tribunal, the merits of the dispute would then hâve to be re-argued 
before the arbitration board. Thus, it is clear that intervention by the 
tribunal would offer the dual disadvantages of redundancy and delay. 
The fact is that restricting the scope of bargainable and arbitrable issues 
does impose strain upon the collective bargaining process, since it is 
difficult to confine issues to a pre-determined mould. Leaving the déter-
mination of arbitrability to the board of arbitration should serve to relieve 
some of those strains by providing more flexibility at the initial stages 
and, at the same time, preventing redundancy and delay. 
DETERMINATION OF BARGAINING UNITS 
The shape of the bargaining units is another distinctive feature of 
the Act. Not only do most of thèse units cover the entire province, but 
they ail also cover a number of disparate occupational catégories. The 
pattern is provided by those bargaining units established by régulation 10. 
The largest bargaining unit is one comprised of ail public servants sub-
ject, of course, to the exclusion of those persons not covered by the Act. 
Another province-wide bargaining unit is established for employées of 
the Liquor Control Board and Liquor Licence Board. There are two 
province-wide units covering employées of the Community Collèges, one 
for support staff and one for académie staff. The anomalies appear to 
be the two bargaining units established for employées of the Niagara 
Parks Commission, one for Commission police and one for other em-
ployées, and the bargaining unit established for employées of the Ontario 
Housing Corporation within the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. 
The tribunal has the jurisdiction to détermine the shape of any new 
bargaining units that might émerge n . This jurisdiction has been exercised 
on only one occasion when the tribunal dealt with an application of Local 
767 of the Canadian Union of Public Employées for représentation rights 
in respect of three local bargaining units (at Windsor, Oshawa, and Ha-
milton) of employées of the Ontario Housing Corporation. The tribunal 
in a lengthy décision, set out what it considered to be the relevant consi-
dérations in determining the shape of bargaining units. The three gênerai 
10 O. Regs. 576/72, 577/72. 
n S. 3. 
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considérations taken into account by the board were (1) freedom of 
association and community of interest; (2) the cost of collective bar-
gaining; and (3) the public interest. 
In dealing with the factor of freedom of association and community 
of interest, the tribunal took the approach that, where the provincial 
government is employer, the geographical boundaries of community of 
interest are more likely to be provincial rather than local. The tribunal 
took notice of the fact that terms and conditions of employment for 
provincial employées tended to be uniform throughout the province. 
Moreover, the tribunal also placed weight upon the related factor that 
management tended to be centralized. In dealing with the cost of collec-
tive bargaining, the tribunal expressed concern about the expense of 
fragmenting the collective bargaining structure by sanctioning a number 
of local units. In the view of the tribunal, a multiplicity of bargaining 
units would likely tax the resources of both the employer and the em-
ployée organizations, and might resuit in small groups of employées, be-
cause of the cost, ne ver having the opportunity to organize. Finally, the 
tribunal defined the public interest in terms of a strong, realthy collective 
bargaining relationship. In the view of the tribunal, since the right to 
strike was not available, vigorous collective bargaining depended on the 
employée organization possessing adéquate resources to finance the re-
search and advocacy required to meet the employer on equal terms. 
The Ontario Housing Corporation décision contains a very clear 
statement by the tribunal favouring large, province-wide bargaining units. 
This policy recognizes the need for strong bargaining agents, and the 
need to concentrate collective bargaining. On the other hand, it must 
be recognized that this policy may put certain strains on the bargaining 
agent and the bargaining process. The bargaining agent, rather than the 
employer, is likely to become the focal point of competing demands from 
groups of employées, requiring it to recognize régional différences and 
différent employée values when formulating bargaining demands. Because 
collective bargaining has been concentrated, it is likely that a greater 
number of issues will hâve to be resolved by the parties at the bargaining 
table. Skilled negotiation by both parties will be required if the collective 
bargaining process is to withstand thèse strains. 
MANDATORY REPRESENTATION ELECTION 
Another distinctive feature of the Crown Employées Collective Bar-
gaining Act is the mandatory requirement of a vote to establish whether 
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the employée organization enjoys the support of a majority of the bar-
gaining unit.12 In the context of public sector collective bargaining this 
requirement makes some sensé. First, given the size and composition 
of the bargaining units, there is some justification for ensuring that 
the bargaining agent is truly représentative of at least a majority of 
the members of the unit. Moreover, the public position of the government, 
in favour of public sector collective bargaining makes it unlikely that it 
will improperly influence employées during the time needed to hold the 
vote. 
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 
The requirement that bargaining agents be politically neutral is 
another interesting feature of the Crown Employées Collective Bargaining 
Act. The Act establishes political neutrality as a condition of légal status, 
not recognizing any employée organization that supports any political 
party, either directly or by receiving money from employées to be used 
as a contribution to a political party.13 It would appear that the purpose 
of this section is to isolate the collective bargaining forum from the polit-
ical forum, not by completely prohibiting public appeals by bargaining 
agents, but by requiring that bargaining agents not play party politics in 
making such appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Future developments of collective bargaining in the Ontario public 
sector are difficult to predict at this stage. There will, of course, soon be 
a légal structure established for teacher bargaining. Hopefully, such a 
structure can accommodate the competing requirements of local partici-
pation and central accountability. Some modification may be necessary 
to the légal structure governing hospital bargaining and university bar-
gaining in order to deal with the same type of problem. In other areas 
of the Ontario public sector, developments are likely to occur at the 
administrative level, on a case-by-case basis, as the relatively new légal 
structure receives use. This should be the test of whether the Crown 
Employées Collective Bargaining Act has been successful in providing 
for workable collective bargaining that does not unduly impede the 
function of governance. 
12 S. 4. 
13 S. 1 (1) (h) ( i ) , ( i i) , (iii), (iv). 
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La structure juridique de la négociation collective en Ontario 
Cet article a pour objet de décrire la structure juridique instituée en Ontario 
en matière de négociation collective dans le secteur public. Le problème fondamental 
auquel on fait face est sans contredit la tension créée par le conflit entre le rôle 
traditionnel du gouvernement en tant qu'autorité souveraine et sa vocation de partie 
dans une négociation collective. 
Le secteur public comprend tous les employés dont la rémunération, directe 
ou indirecte, provient effectivement des fonds de la Province. Pour la plupart de 
ces employés, le mécanisme de négociation collective relève du Crown Employées 
Collective Bargaining Act, mais on y trouve certaines exclusions importantes. Pour 
la Sûreté ontarienne, les modalités de la négociation collective sont insérées dans le 
Police Act. Les employés des hôpitaux, des écoles et des universités de la Province 
ainsi que ceux de l'Hydro ontarienne et de YOntario Northland Transportation Com-
mission sont soumis au même régime que les travailleurs du secteur privé et relè-
vent, par conséquent, du Labour Relations Act. Les enseignants des écoles élémen-
taires et secondaires sont à l'écart de tout régime particulier de négociation collective, 
mais il semble que le gouvernement soit sur le point d'établir pour ce groupe d'em-
ployés un régime de négociation particulier. L'image d'ensemble donne l'impression 
de ressembler à une espèce de catalogue de structures juridiques fort biganée. 
Le Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act régit la plus grande partie des 
employés de la fonction publique. I/interdiction absolue de tout recours à la grève 
est la caractéristique principale de cette loi. Le pouvoir de négociation, en l'absence 
de toute sanction économique, doit reposer sur les pressions auprès de l'opinion 
publique. Les unités de négociation sont vastes de façon à permettre aux agents 
de négociation d'avoir des ressources financières suffisantes pour appuyer leur cause 
auprès de la population. L'ampleur de ces unités de négociation justifie en contre-
partie l'interdiction du droit de grève. 
L'arbitrage exécutoire des différends pourvoit à la solution des impasses. La 
tâche la plus délicate du conseil d'arbitrage réside dans la détermination du champ 
de compétence fixé par la loi relativement aux questions sujettes à la négociation, 
car il semble exister un jeu de chevauchement entre les termes de la loi qui excluent 
certaines matières de la négociation et de l'arbitrage et les termes de la loi qui dé-
clarent expressément que certaines autres questions sont négociables et arbitrables. 
Récemment, le Public Service Labour Relations Tribunal, organisme qui a la res-
ponsabilité de l'administration de la Loi, a décrété que le conseil d'arbitrage avait 
compétence en première instance selon la Loi pour fixer les points sujets à négo-
ciation. Cette décision, par conséquent, favorise une flexibilité plus grande au 
commencement des négociations. Les employés peuvent présenter leurs revendica-
tions sans être obligés d'avoir à en justifier la négociabilité devant le tribunal. En 
outre, étant donné que l'enjeu de la négociabilité et le mérite de l'affaire sont 
souvent reliés, le refus du tribunal d'établir la légitimité des revendications des 
employés signifie qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de débattre deux fois le point de vue 
des parties, une fois devant le tribunal et une autre fois devant le conseil d'arbitrage. 
Les unités de négociation établies par règlement au moment de l'entrée en 
vigueur de la Loi, sont peu nombreuses, s'étendent à la grandeur de la Province et 
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comprennent un grand nombre de catégories professionnelles disparates. Le tribunal 
a compétence pour tailler toute unité de négociation nouvelle qui peut s'imposer. 
Dans une cause récente qui se rapportait au personnel de Y Ontario Housing Cor-
poration, le tribunal dégagea clairement, dans une décision relative au caractère 
approprié de l'unité de négociation, les critères suivants : 1) la liberté d'association 
et la communauté d'intérêts; 2) le coût de la négociation collective; 3) l'intérêt 
public. D'une façon plus précise, le tribunal a considéré que, étant donné que le 
gouvernement est l'employeur, la communauté d'intérêts s'étend à l'ensemble du 
territoire de la Province et non aux régions et aux localités. Le tribunal s'est aussi 
inquiété du coût de la négociation collective à la suite de l'établissement d'unités 
de négociation locales fragmentées. Enfin, étant donné l'interdiction du droit de 
grève, des unités de négociation étendues si les associations d'employés veulent 
discuter à force égale avec l'employeur. Il est donc clair que le tribunal a adopté 
une politique qui favorise des unités de négociation s'étendant à tout le territoire 
de la Province. 
La Loi présente deux autres traits caractéristiques intéressants. En premier 
lieu, en vertu de la Loi, la tenue d'un vote est obligatoire pour établir le caractère 
représentatif d'une association d'employés. De plus, la Loi exige la neutralité poli-
tique comme condition de l'obtention du statut juridique; elle va jusqu'à exclure les 
associations d'employés qui appuient des partis politiques. Il semble que l'objet 
de cette exigence est de séparer le forum de la négociation collective du forum 
politique, non pas en interdisant d'une façon absolue les pressions auprès du public 
de la part des agents négociateurs, mais exigeant que ces derniers ne jouent pas la 
carte politique lors de ces pressions. 
L'avenir de la négociation collective dans le secteur public en Ontario est difficile 
à prévoir. Des changements sont susceptibles de se produire au niveau administratif 
au fur et à mesure de l'examen des causes, en autant qu'une nouvelle structure 
juridique pourra être mise en vigueur. Ces modifications devraient permettre de se 
rendre compte si le Crown Employées Collective Bargaining Act a réussi à implanter 
un régime de convention collective valable qui ne fait pas trop obstacle à la fonction 
gouvernementale. 
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